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Illegal Migration, Wages, and Remittances: 
Semi-Parametric Estimation of Illegality Effects
* 
 
We consider the issue of illegal migration from Mexico to the US, and examine whether the 
lack of legal status causally impacts on outcomes, specifically wages and remitting behavior. 
These outcomes are of particular interest given the extent of legal and illegal migration, and 
the resulting financial flows. We formalize this question and highlight the principal empirical 
problem using a potential outcome framework with endogenous selection. The selection bias 
is captured by a control function, which is estimated non-parametrically. The framework for 
remitting is extended to allow for endogenous regressors (e.g. wages). We propose a new re-
parametrisation of the control function, which is linear in case of a normal error structure, and 
test linearity. Using Mexican Migration project data, we find considerable and robust illegality 
effects on wages, the penalty being about 12% in the 1980s and 22% in the 1990s. For the 
latter period, the selection bias is not created by a normal error structure; wrongly imposing 
normality overestimates the illegality effect on wages by 50%, while wrongly ignoring 
selection leads to a 50% underestimate. In contrast to these wage penalties, legal status 
appears to have mixed effects on remitting behavior. 
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Almost 3 percent of the world population are labor migrants. A substantial
proportion of this worldwide labor migration is illegal, deﬁned as unauthorized
border crossing, or entry by tourist visa and subsequent illegal work. For exam-
ple1, in 2005 between 10-15 percent of all migrants are thought to be illegal. In
terms of absolute numbers, the USA hosts an estimated 9 million irregular mi-
grants, and in the UK around 0.5 out of 4.3 million migrants are deemed illegal.
The annual inﬂow of illegal migrants into the EU is estimated to equal about
half a million. This scale has resulted in huge public concern, and governments
spending vast resources on seeking to stem the tide of illegal migration.
This extent of illegal migration presents a challenge for both policy makers
and researchers. Despite the size of illegal migration little is known about illegal
migrants, their characteristics and behavior. This is perhaps not surprising since
illegal migration is an unlawful, criminal activity. Standard data sets simply do
not record legal status.
This paper is about the eﬀect of the lack of legal status on migrations’ out-
comes in the host country. Using a unique data set which records the legal
status of migrants we focus on illegal migrants directly and consider, in partic-
ular, wages earned in the host country and remitting behavior. The importance
of wages is obvious. The relevance of remitting behavior follows from the obser-
vation that the huge ﬂow of labour migration has lead to huge remittance ﬂows
(World Bank, 2006, see also Rapoport and Docquier, 2006). In 2003 recorded
remittances amounted to almost US$ 116 billion or 1.7 percent of the recipient
developing countries’ GDP, the largest share (29 percent) being remitted from
the US. For many LDCs remittances now surpass overseas oﬃcial development
aid, are more stable than foreign direct investment, and instrumental in reduc-
ing poverty. Some commentators suggest that informal remittances amount to
about 35—75 percent of oﬃcial remittances to developing countries. Thus the
impact of illegal migration on remittances, which has not been studied before, is
important for policymakers. We examine these general issues in the particular
context of Mexican migration to the US.
More speciﬁcally, we quantify the causal impact of the lack of legal status
on the host country outcomes wages and remitting, referred to below as “il-
legality eﬀects”. We make both substantive empirical contributions as well as
some methodological contributions. Empirically, we are the ﬁrst to deﬁne for-
mally illegality eﬀects using a framework which highlights the principal empirical
problem, viz. identiﬁcation of the causal eﬀect in the presence of endogenous se-
lection. Work which has considered illegality eﬀects on wages has either ignored
selection altogether, or has not addressed this issue convincingly. No work has
considered illegality eﬀects on remitting behavior, despite the huge importance
of remittances.
Methodologically, we apply the potential outcome framework with endoge-
nous selection in which the selection bias is captured using a non-parametrically
1For estimates see e.g. IOM (2005), ILO (2004), and Woodbridge (2005).
2estimated control function. While this framework has been examined before
(Pinkse, 2000, Blundell and Powell, 2004 and Heckman and Navarro, 2004),
we propose a new re-parametrisation of the control function. This shape of
this control function is of considerable interest for empirical work. The leading
empirical parametric modelling of endogenous selection assumes normality of
error terms which leads to a linear control function. Hence we test for linear-
ity formally. It turns out that in our empirical application for the 1990s data
we ﬁnd considerable non-linearities. It is therefore of interest to quantify the
misspeciﬁcation bias of the normal model, and we ﬁnd the illegality eﬀect on
wages is overestimated by 50%, while wrongly ignoring selection leads to a 50%
underestimate. The model is estimated using penalized regression splines, and
inference methods take into account the generated regressor problems as well as
potential heteroscedasticity. To improve asymptotic eﬃciency we also propose
an alternative estimator which uses iteratively a weighting scheme based on a
variance regression. In our analysis of illegality eﬀects on remitting behavior we
extend the potential outcome framework with endogenous selection to allow for
endogenous regressors since remitting behavior is a function of wages, which in
turn are aﬀected by legal status.
Whether causal illegality eﬀects are present is an empirical question as eco-
nomic theory does not give a unique prediction. Consider wages earned in the
host country. In a wage bargaining setting, illegal migrants typically have lower
bargaining power than legal migrants. Legal migrants can search freely the
labour market, whereas illegal migrants cannot. In addition, illegal migrants
could have lower reservation wages than legal migrants, in which case standard
search or Roy models predict lower average wages. Illegal and legal migrants
might face segmented labour markets, with illegal migrants taking on diﬀerent
jobs. On the other hand, the main driver of diﬀerences in outcomes between
legal and illegal migrants could be diﬀerences in observable characteristics such
as human capital rather than illegality eﬀects. As regards remitting behavior,
consider both the incidence of remitting and the amount remitted conditional
on remitting. Illegality might have no direct eﬀect on the amount remitted,
apart from the indirect eﬀect induced by the wage penalty caused by the lack
of legal status. We control for this potentially confounding factor. On the other
hand, illegality might give rise to a new “exchange motive” for remitting, in
that illegal migrants might have a larger preference for remitting. Alternatively,
illegality might reﬂect a greater need of the source household (and we control for
selection on such unobservables). Finally, the illegality eﬀect might be negative
if illegal migrants retain more money to reﬂect the increased precariousness of
their situation as a result of intensiﬁed eﬀorts by host countries (such as the
US) to detect illegal immigrants.
Our speciﬁc empirical setting is Mexican migration to the US. Using data
from the Mexican Migration project (MMP), we ﬁnd considerable and robust
illegality eﬀects on wages, the penalty being about 12% in the 1980s and 22 % in
the 1990s. By contrast legal status appears to have little eﬀect on the incidence
of remitting, but does aﬀect negatively the amounts remitted in the 1990s.
These results support the hypothesis that wage penalties arise from limited job
3search and weaker bargaining power. As the US government increased its eﬀort
in detecting illegal migrants this bargaining power eroded further, while reduced
remittances reﬂect increased precariousness of the illegal migrant’s situation.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we consider illegality eﬀects
on wages earned in the host country. We present the potential outcome model
with endogenous selection, and our new re-parametrisation of the control func-
tion which captures the selection bias. Formal consideration of remitting behav-
ior is postponed to Section 5 since we need to extend the estimation framework
to allow for endogenous regressors, as remitting depends on wages. Estimation
is carried out using penalized regression splines, and we brieﬂy summarize the
estimation method, distributional theory, and methods of inference. Details are
collected in Appendix A. Section 3 describes the data, and the empirical analy-
sis of illegality eﬀects on wages is carried out in Section 4. We focus ﬁrst on
the shape of the control function, the estimated illegality eﬀects, and the extent
of the misspeciﬁcation bias of illegality eﬀects were one to ignore selection or
impose joint normality of errors. Section 4.4 carries out two robustness checks.
Remitting behavior is examined in Section 5, which contains both estimation
framework and empirics. The ﬁnal section concludes.
1.1 Illegality Eﬀects, Mexican Migration, and the Litera-
ture
The leading case in the empirical illegality literature is Mexican migration to
the US, the reported statistics being truly impressive. More than 1.6 million
illegal border crossings have been intercepted by border guards in 2000 (INS),
one third of Mexican residents in the USA are believed to be unauthorized,
and Passel (2002) estimates that 80% of all Mexican immigrants who arrived
in the 1990s were unauthorized. Illustrating the importance of remittances, the
World Bank estimates that Mexican workers abroad remitted about 2% of the
country’s GNI in 2003. Our empirical analysis is also placed in this geographical
setting.
While much is known about legal Mexican migration to the US, the empir-
ical literature on illegality eﬀects is thin. Rivera-Batiz (1999) seeks to identify
illegality eﬀects through the amnesty of 1986 (the Immigration Reform and Con-
trol Act). Using the 1990 Legalized Population Survey, he ﬁnds a 52% wage
gap unexplainable by diﬀerences in observable characteristics. The analysis is
based on Blinder-Oaxaca wage decompositions and ignores potential selection
eﬀects. In our analysis we ﬁnd important selection biases for our 1990s data. By
contrast, Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark (2002) address the selection issue using a
diﬀerence estimator. They also use the Legalized Population Survey to consider
illegal migrants, and construct a comparison group of Latino men from NLSY
data. Hanson (2006) criticizes this strategy and observes that the comparison
group of Latino men (i.e. mainly US citizens of Hispanic descent who were born
and educated in the US) does not capture the required counterfactual, i.e. the
average wage outcomes of migrants who migrated illegally had they migrated
legally instead. The illegality eﬀect is identiﬁed by a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence if
4the systematic diﬀerence between the two treatment and comparison group, the
selection bias, is time invariant and thus diﬀerences out. It is open to debate
whether this parallel trends assumption holds at a time of many changes in
migration policy. The reported wage penalty ranges from 14% to 24%. We
obtain similar estimates, but employ a completely diﬀerent and much less re-
strictive identiﬁcation strategy. Neither Rivera-Batiz (1999) nor Kossoudji and
Cobb-Clark (2002) consider the role of networks, whereas we do. To the best of
our knowledge, no one has examined illegality eﬀects on remittances. See also
Hanson (2006) for other aspects of illegal Mexican migration.
We estimate illegality eﬀects based on the Mexican Migration project (MMP).
This is one of the few well-tested data sets which records the legal status of mi-
grants. Work by economists based on MMP data has considered, among other
issues, measuring network eﬀects (e.g. Munshi, 2003), the eﬀects of border en-
forcement and people smuggler prices on demand (e.g. Angelucci, 2005), and
the estimation of hazard rate models of illegal migration (Orrenius and Zavodny,
2005).
2 Estimating Illegality Eﬀects
Does the mere lack of legal documents have a causal eﬀect on outcomes? For
expositional clarity we consider ﬁrst only ﬁnal outcomes such as wages earned
in the host country. The case of remitting behavior is more involved since it is
an outcome which depends on an intermediate outcome (wages), both of which
are potentially aﬀected by legal status. We postpone the discussion of this case
to Section 5 where we extend the framework to include endogenous regressors.
We use a potential outcome framework to rigorously deﬁne illegality eﬀects.
We then add more structure to the potential outcomes, formalize the endogenous
selection problem, and capture the selection bias using a non-parametrically
estimated control function.2 Similar frameworks have been considered by e.g.
Pinkse (2000), Blundell and Powell (2004) and Heckman and Navarro (2004).
We add to these insights by proposing an insightful re-parametrisation of the
control function. The empirical literature typically either ignores selection or
imposes linearity on our control function via a normality assumption. Hence
we will focus on testing the shape of our control function, and in the empirical
application we will quantify the misspeciﬁcation biases in terms of the associated
estimated illegality eﬀects.
2We follow the literature and ignore additional selection into work in the host country. This
is justiﬁable in our empirical setting of Mexican migration to the US, since almost all Mexican
labor migrants work in the US. As in the literature we also ignore selection into migration.
However, by conditioning on illegal status (I) we do capture common unobservables that also
aﬀect the migration decision. We believe that the most likely barrier to costly migration is
credit constraints, and that its incidence should be uncorrelated with the error terms in the
wage equations conditional on I.
52.1 Potential Outcomes and Endogenous Selection
We formalize the illegality eﬀect using a potential outcome model. Let Ii =
1(i is illegal) denote the indicator of whether migrant i is illegal (equal to 1
if i is illegal and zero otherwise).3 For outcomes, denote by Y1i the potential
outcome of migrant i if he migrates illegally, and by Y0i if he migrates legally.
Y0i is the counterfactual outcome for Ii =1 ,a n dt h eobserved outcome is Yi =
Y1iIi + Y0i (1 − Ii). The idiosyncratic loss from migrating illegally is Y1i − Y0i,
and the average illegality eﬀect, our principal object of interest, is
δ ≡ E {Y1i − Y0i|Ii =1 }. (1)
The potential outcomes (Y0i,Y 1i) and Ii might not be independent, so selec-
tion might be endogenous, which gives rise to the principal estimation problem.
Such dependence could stem from unobserved ability or motivation and willing-
ness to endure hardship as illegal migration is typically physically and mentally
taxing, or from unobserved network eﬀects.
We add more structure to the potential outcomes and the selection indicator
I. In particular, let
Y1 = μ1 + W1
Y0 = μ0 + W0.
We have dropped the migrant subscript i for notational simplicity. WI with
I ∈ {0,1} denotes idiosyncratic deviations from the population averages with
E {WI} =0 . These deviations are allowed to vary with observable character-
istics X, and we assume that WI = g(X)+VI for some smooth scalar-valued
function g with E {VI} =0 , Va r{VI} = σ2
I and E {g(X)} =0 . g(X) is a
common eﬀect.
Next, consider the event I =1 . Determination of illegal status is modelled by
the reduced form4 I =1( μU (Z)+U>0) where μU (Z) is some smooth scalar-
valued function of observables Z. U is the individual’s variation about the
population value μU (Z) with distribution function F, E {U} =0and Va r{U}
normalized to 1 for identiﬁcation. Let F (x)=1− F (x). The propensity score
of the event I =1is denoted by
p(Z) ≡ Pr{I =1 |Z} = F (−μU (Z)). (2)
3In our data, illegality is self-reported. Potential misclassiﬁcation error is more a theoretical
than practical concern because data collectors are believed to have established good relation-
ships with interview subjects which has resulted in high quality data. Interviewees have no
incentives to lie about their legal status. In particular, the incidence of illegality in our data
is consistent with external estimates (e.g. Passel, 2002); other covariates have been similarly
validated (see Section 3). We have therefore not incorporated potential misclassiﬁcation error
into our estimation framework.
4We are agnostic about the underlying structural model giving rise to this reduced form.
One possibility is a choice framework based on a Roy model with individual legal status speciﬁc
migration costs. Alternatively, the reduced form could describe outcomes of institutional
processes.
6Z is assumed to contain some observables, say Z2, which are excluded from the
outcome equations and thus are not part of X, Z ≡ [X,Z2],a n dt h ep r o p e n s i t y
score is assumed to be a non-trivial function of these Z2. We discuss the speciﬁc
exclusion restrictions in the empirical part of the paper. We also assume that
(U,V0,V 1) are independent (or at least mean-independent) of X and Z,a n d
that 0 <p(z) < 1.
(V0,V 1) and U might be dependent, inducing the selection problem. We
capture the resulting biases explicitly by control functions. Deﬁne
K1 (Z) ≡ E {V1|Z,I =1 } = E {V1|U>−μU (Z)} (3)
K0 (Z) ≡ E {V0|Z,I =0 } = E {V0|U<−μU (Z)}.
The illegality eﬀect in this extended framework becomes
δ =[ μ1 − μ0]+E {V1 − V0|I =1 }








The observable outcomes are Y = Y0 +( Y1 − Y0)I, therefore
Y = μ0 + g(X)+V0 +[ μ1 − μ0 + V1 − V0]I
= μ0 + g(X)+[ μ1 − μ0]I + K (I,Z)+ε, (5)
with composite control function K (I,Z)=K0 (Z)+[ K1 (Z) − K0 (Z)]I and
E {ε|X,Z,I} =0where ε =( 1− I)[V0 − K0 (Z)] + I [V1 − K1 (Z)].T h i s i s a
non-parametric version of Heckman’s (1979) classic control function approach.
2.1.1 Identiﬁcation
Do the observable data identify this illegality eﬀect ? The identiﬁcation issues
in models of this type are well know (see e.g. Imbens and Angrist, 1994). The
control function is identiﬁed up to a constant because of the assumed exclusion
restrictions concerning Z2. The illegality eﬀect is identiﬁed in the special cases
when the error terms (U,V0,V 1) are independent, or when V0 = V1 so that
all individual eﬀects are constant, Y1 − Y0 = μ1 − μ0.T h e i d e n t i ﬁcation of
μ1 − μ0 and thus of δ in the general case requires a further restriction. We
follow common practice and assume ‘identiﬁcation at inﬁnity’, i.e. the existence
of two limits sets for the covariates such that the propensity score converges to
0 on one set and to 1 on the other. In addition, our re-parametrisation of the
control function, described next, requires that the distribution function of U is
strictly monotonic.
2.2 Re-Parametrising the Control Function
We propose a new insightful re-parametrisation of the control function. The
leading case in the applied literature which does seek to control for endogenous
7selection assumes joint normality of errors. In this case our re-parametrised
control function is shown below to be linear.
Following Das et al. (2003), we impose a restriction on the joint distribution
of (U,V0,V 1) such that the individual control functions are smooth functions
only of the propensity score: K0 (Z)=g0 (p(Z)) and K1 (Z)=g1 (p(Z)) for
some smooth functions gI. Given the independence assumption above, this
property follows if the distribution function of U, F, is strictly monotonic, since
then K1 (Z)=E {V1|U>−μU (Z)} = E {V1|W<p (Z)} with W = F (U) and
K0 (Z)=E {V0|W>p (Z)}.
Next, we seek a further transformation which relates to the Normal model.
If (U,VI) follows a joint Normal distribution with correlation coeﬃcient ρI and
Va r{VI} = σ2
I, the resulting control functions are K1 (Z)=ρ1σ2
1λ(−μU (Z)),
and K0 (Z)=ρ0σ2
0λ(−μU (Z)) × (−p(Z))/(1 − p(Z)) where λ denotes the
inverse Mill’s ratio λ(−x)=φ(x)/Φ(x),a n dφand Φ denote the Gaussian
density and distribution. The control functions are linear in λ, the propensity










/x with t(p)=λ.T h ee v e n tW<pis equivalent to the event
t(W) >λ , and the control function K1 c a nt h e r e f o r eb ew r i t t e na ss m o o t hf u n c -
tion of λ: K1 (Z)=f1 (λ). In order to re-parametrise the control function K0,
we follow application of the transform t by multiplying by the strictly decreas-
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A ﬁnal re-parametrisation internalizes the switching between f0 and f1,a n d
thus achieves a compact formulation as follows. Deﬁne the hazard h(I,Z) by
h(I,Z)=
(
λ(−μU (Z)) if I =1
−
p(Z)
1−p(Z)λ(−μU (Z)) if I =0 (6)
with h>0 for I =1and h<0 for I =0 . For notational convenience we
suppress the dependence of h on I and Z, as we did for the dependence of p
and λ on Z. The composite control function K (I,Z) can then be written as a
function of h,
K (I,Z)=f (h) (7)
with h = h(I,Z). The assumption that E {V0} = E {V1} =0implies that f is
continuous at 0 with f (0) = 0.5 We ﬁnally assume that f is a smooth function
everywhere, i.e. twice continuously diﬀerentiable, except for a possible kink at
0.





= E {V1|W<1} = E {V1} =0 . Similarly, for I =0 , h → 0− is equivalent to




= E {V0|W>0} = E {V0} =0 .
82.2.1 A Special Case: Joint Normality of Errors
We show that f is linear if the errors follow a normal distribution.6 Assume
then ﬁrst that (U,V0,V 1) are jointly normal, and further that V0 = V1.T h e nf
is linear throughout with
f (h)=ρU,V σV × h, (8)
where ρA,B is the correlation coeﬃcient between A and B,a n dσ2
j the variance
of Vj . This is the leading case in the applied literature (e.g. Maddala, 1983).
With V0 = V1 it follows then that the illegality eﬀect satisﬁes δ = μ1 − μ0.
This setting can be generalized by allowing the error terms in the outcome
equation to diﬀer, V0 6= V1.W eh a v e
f (h)=
£
ρU,V1σ11(h ≥ 0) + ρU,V0σ01(h<0)
¤
× h (9)







2.3 The Estimation Equation
Returning to the estimation equation (5), writing K (I,Z)=f (h), the principal
estimation equation is









satisfying E {θ|X,Z,I} =0 .7 We have taken explicitly
into account that h will have to be generated from a ﬁrst-stage estimation.
μ1 − μ0 is estimated without bias by the coeﬃcient of I. In order to estimate
the illegality eﬀect δ given by (4), we recover the individual control functions
from our estimate of f, then compute for each illegal migrant the bracketed
term in (4), and average this over the entire group of illegal migrants.
2.4 Estimation via Penalized Regression Splines, Infer-
ence, and Testing: A brief Sketch
We estimate equation (10) and the preliminary propensity score equation (2)
non-parametrically using penalized regression splines. In view of the curse of
6Note that we argue that if (not iﬀ) (U,V0,V 1) are joint normal, then a linear control
function results. Hence we test for normality by testing for linearity. It is conceivable that
linearity also obtains for distributions other than the Gaussian. We control for this situation
in the empirical application by comparing the point estimates of the illegality coeﬃcient (the
principal object of interest) for the unrestricted and the normal model.





about −μU (Z) shows that the error induced by the generated regressor,




, is proportional to (e μU (Z) − μU (Z)). Hence the rate of convergence of the
estimator is not negatively aﬀected by the generated regressor problem.
9dimensionality and the sample sizes available to us, we follow common practice
and impose additively separability of covariates, so that g(X)=
P
gk (xk) with
X =[ x1,..,xK]. Hence our estimation method is semi-parametric.89
Details and formal deﬁnitions are given in Appendix A. Our estimators are
standard, and we follow the non-parametric literature in using the generalized
cross-validation (GCV ) score both to estimate the smoothing parameter (in our
context the roughness penalty), and to select between competing models. In
particular, we want to compare estimates of equation (10), and speciﬁcally of
[μ1 − μ0], when the control function f is unrestricted, to estimates when f is
restricted to be identically zero (so endogenous selection is ignored) or linear (the
two normal models of equations (8) and (9)). For the estimator see Appendix
Section A.1, and for the GCV score see equation (16).
The distributional theory for the estimator (see Appendix Section A.2) is
standard, and the estimators are asymptotically normally distributed under
standard regularity conditions. Moreover, the estimator achieve the optimal
nonparametric convergence rate.
I n f e r e n c ei sm o r ei n v o l v e dt h a ni nas t andard setting. Estimation of the
covariance matrix of the estimators needs to take into account the generated re-
gressor problem introduced by the ﬁrst step estimation of h and a heteroscedas-
ticity issue. Appendix A.3 sketches the details of our covariance estimation,
w h e r ew ee x t e n ds t a n d a r dm e t h o d s . E ﬃciency gains in estimating, say, the
control function f are conceivable were one to consider the error structure in
the estimation step. We therefore propose an alternative estimator, in which
the error structure is directly taken into account via a variance regression, which
in turn induces a weighted point estimation (see Appendix Section A.3.2). The
standard penalized regression spline estimate of the control function is denoted
by b f, whereas the weighted estimate is denoted by b fw.
Hypothesis testing is carried out using Wald tests. Of particular interest
is the linearity of the control function f since the normal model (8) is often
used in the literature. The Wald test statistic is given by equation (17) in
Appendix Section A.4.1. We complement this formal procedure, of course, by
visual inspection of b f. Additional information is provided and reported below
by the estimated rank of the part of the smoother matrix pertaining to f,g i v e n
by the number of positive eigenvalues, since using a full rank penalized cubic
regression spline to estimate a linear function results in an estimated rank of
one.
8For the data at our disposal this is not too restrictive, since many of our regressors are
dummies. We have also experimented with interactions.
9Other semi-parametric estimators are available. Das, Newey, and Vella (2003) use un-
penalized series estimation, i.e. an estimator which uses a polynomial basis. Our estimator
uses cubic spline basis instead and imposes a roughness penalty, because of its more attractive
approximation-theoretic properties (see e.g. Wahba, 1990, and Green and Silverman, 1994).
102.5 Summary and Empirical Agenda
Our empirical analysis will focus on two issues, namely ﬁrst the shape of the con-
trol function f, and second the estimate of the illegality eﬀect δ. The principal
estimation equation is (10) and we estimate the unknown functions under the
assumption of additive separability using penalized regression splines. Methods
for inferences are adapted to the particular error structure of (10).
The illegality eﬀect δ in the econometric potential outcome model with en-
dogenous selection is given by equation (4). Its ﬁrst term, μ1 −μ0,i se s t i m a t e d
directly as the illegality coeﬃcient in the estimation equation (10), the second
term (the selection bias) is obtained as an averaged prediction for the group of
illegal migrants.
Our interest in the shape of the control function f arises from the observation
that the literature either ignores endogenous selection (f (h) ≡ 0), or imposes
linearity by assuming joint normality of the errors (U,V0,V 1) and V0 = V1,s e e
equation (8). We therefore formally test linearity of f using both the unweighted
and the asymptotically more eﬃcient weighted estimator b f and b fw.
Finally, we use a standard model selection criterion, the GCV score, to select
between the model with the unrestricted control function f and models with
the parametric restriction of the literature imposed (f ≡ 0, equation (8), or its
generalization in equation (9)), and quantify the extent of the selection bias by
comparing the illegality coeﬃcients [μ1 − μ0] using the unrestricted f and the
potentially misspeciﬁed parametric f.
3T h e D a t a
We use data from the Mexican Migration Project (MMP93), a collaborative re-
search project based at the Princeton University and the University of Guadala-
jara. We brieﬂy describe some general features of the data.10 Each year since
1982, the MMP interviews a random sample of 200 households in two to ﬁve
Mexican communities. Following completion of the Mexican surveys, inter-
viewers travel to destination areas in the United States to administer identical
questionnaires to migrants from the same communities sampled in Mexico who
have settled north of the border. However, we have excluded the US sample
because of questionable survey methods as it is not clear what the population
sampled from represents. The survey is cross-sectional. The complete Mexican
sample includes ca. 16,000 households in 93 communities in 17 Mexican states.
These communities represent a wide range of regions, ethnic compositions and
economic conditions, covering isolated rural towns, larger farming communities,
as well as metropolitan areas.
The principal focus of the survey is the household head. Crucially for our
purposes, the survey elicits information about the mode of entry to the US.
We deﬁned as illegal migrants those migrants who have entered the US ‘without
documents’, or who have entered the US on a tourist visa and have subsequently
10For more details see the project’s website at http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu.
11worked. This deﬁnes our illegal indicator Ii w h i c hi se q u a lt o1i fm i g r a n ti is
illegal, and zero otherwise. Detailed information about the household head’s
illegal migration history include the number of border apprehensions, and the
price paid to a people smuggler (‘coyote’). In order to be included in the Mexican
survey, the household head must have completed or temporarily interrupted the
migration spell or the main respondent reports on his behalf. Note, however,
that the typical Mexican migration to the US tends to be circular and of ‘short’
duration.
The survey records standard labour market performance measures for the
time before and during the last migration spell, as well as remitting behavior.
Also included are standard demographic and economic information about the
individual migrant and his household (except for household income), as well as
community and municipality characteristics based on census data. Events at
the household level which might have led to the migration, such as crop failure
or other adverse events, are not surveyed.
Massey and Zenteno (2000) report a systematic comparison between the
MMP and a nationally representative survey (Encuesta National de la Dinamica
Demograﬁca implemented by Mexico’s national statistical institute), and con-
clude a close correspondence between migrant characteristics in the two sources
(we do not require the MMP data to be representative of the entire Mexican
population). The MMP is a well-tested and popular data set.
3.1 The Sample
We focus on labor migrants. We therefore consider prime aged male heads of
households (aged below 55) who have migrated for work. Given the temporary
nature of Mexican migration we restrict our analysis to recent migrants at survey
date whose migration duration is less than 5 years, in order to eliminate perma-
nent migrants. We also use retrospective data on migration history and wages,
and limit the recall period to 10 years. Our sample is comprised of individuals
who have migrated in the 1980s and 1990s, and we consider the two decades
separately. This split by decade is motivated by the concerns about changing
characteristics of Mexican immigrants in the literature, and the changing laws
and border enforcement strategies. The samples are of size 595 for the 1980s
and 872 for the 1990s. Finer control of time eﬀects is not practicable given these
sample sizes.
In the Data Appendix, we describe in some detail the variables and measures
used in the subsequent analysis. Selected summary statistics for some of the
covariates used in the analysis are reported in Table 1. The table reveals that
the incidence of illegal migration in our sample is substantial: 81 percent of
migrations embarked on in the 1980s and 63.5 percent in the 1990s are illegal.
Since our sample is conﬁned to heads of households, most of the migrants in our
sample are married. Illegals are on average four years younger than legals, more
likely to be on their ﬁrst trip, the duration of their migration spell (measured in
months) is slightly longer and does not exceed two years (but recall the exclusion
of spells above ﬁve years). Illegal migration from urban areas is substantial, as
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Legal Illegal Legal Illegal
migrants migrants migrants migrants
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Incidence [%] 19 81 36.5 63.5
Age at migration 37.3 (10.0) 32.0 (9.5) 36.6 (7.9) 32.3 (8.73)
Married 0.98 (0.13) 0.93 (0.26) 0.96 (0.2) 0.91 (0.28)
Years of education 5.97 (4.64) 5.34 (3.93) 5.59 (3.23) 6.22 (3.46)
Primary school 0.17 (0.39) 0.24 (0.43) 0.36 (0.48) 0.30 (0.46)
Secondary school 0.16 (0.36) 0.15 (0.36) 0.15 (0.36) 0.25 (0.43)
> Secondary school 0.14 (0.35) 0.09 (0.29) 0.07 (0.26) 0.08 (0.28)
English proﬁciency 0.14 (0.35) 0.03 (0.16) 0.06 (0.24) 0.03 (0.16)
Skilled 0.20 (0.4) 0.26 (0.44) 0.13 (0.34) 0.26 (0.44)
Agriculture in Mx 0.38 (0.49) 0.36 (0.48) 0.53 (0.50) 0.34 (0.47)
Migration duration 11.6 (10.7) 12.7 (13.0) 9.66 (9.90) 12.02 (11.45)
First trip 0.07 (0.25) 0.38 (0.49) 0.04 (0.19) 0.37 (0.48)
California 0.62 (0.49) 0.66 (0.47) 0.42 (0.49) 0.38 (0.49)
Table 1: Summary Statistics: Covariates
only around one-third of illegal migrants have worked in agriculture in Mexico.
As regards the human capital variables, in line with the literature, the qual-
ity of legal migrants has deteriorated over time while the proportion of legal
migrants who worked in agriculture in Mexico has increased. The evidence on
whether illegal migrants are typically worse educated or trained than legal one
is mixed. In the 1980s, they had sightly less but in the 1990s slightly more
education. The share of highest level of (self-reported) English proﬁciency is
smaller for illegals. On the other hand, average skills levels are slightly higher
for illegal migrants. A detailed skill tabulation (not reported here) reveals that
most migrants report not to have changed occupation after migrating to the
US. As in Card (2005) we observe a move away from California in the 1990s,
and this applies to both groups of migrants.
In the Data Appendix, we also consider extensively measures of social net-
works. We ﬁnd that both ‘weak ties’ and ‘strong ties’ are more pronounced
for legal migrants than for illegals. For both groups weak ties appear to have
become weaker over the two periods, whereas strong ties have become stronger.
At the same time illegal migrants rely more on relatives to ﬁnd jobs than legal
ones, which is consistent with the hypothesis that they cannot freely search the
labor market because of the lack of legal status.
3.1.1 Outcomes: Wages and Remitting Behavior
The principal outcomes of interest are real hourly log wages (measured in con-
stant 1998 prices) earned in the US and the incidence and intensity of remitting.
Table 2 reports the means and standard deviation.
131980s 1990s
Legal Illegal Legal Illegal
migrants migrants migrants migrants
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Log US wages 2.03 (0.44) 1.79 (0.45) 1.93 (0.40) 1.78 (0.45)
Remittances 321.2 (329.6) 327.1 (408.1) 396.4 (327.0) 330.1 (356.7)
Table 2: Summary Statistics: Outcomes
First consider wages. In the 1980s the means are 1.79 and 2.03 respectively,
and the diﬀerence of -0.23 translates into a substantial wage gap of 21 percent.
For the 1990s data, mean wages for illegal migrants remain stable at 1.78, but
those for legal migrants fall substantially to 1.93 in line with the observed drop
in human capital. The resulting observed wage gap falls to 13 percent. These
wage gaps are consistent with the literature using diﬀerent datasets (e.g. Massey,
1987, Rivera-Batiz, 1999, and Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark, 2002). Rather than
limiting attention to the ﬁrst moment, we proceed to consider the entire wage
distribution. Figure 1 depicts simple kernel density estimates of the uncondi-
tional log wage distributions for legal and illegal migrants. These distributions
are fairly symmetric, concentrated, and have single modes. Compared to legal
migrants, the wage densities for legal migrants are shifted to the left. Inspect-
ing the plots of the respective empirical distribution functions shows that the
wage distribution for illegal migrants ﬁrst order stochastically dominates that
for legal migrants. However, the gap is less pronounced for the 1990s than for
the 1980s.
Figure 1: approximately here
The second outcome to be studied is remitting behavior. In the 1980s legal
and illegal migrants remitted about the same on average, in the 1990s legal
migrants remitted on average more. The incidence of remitting is high. In
the 1990s ca. 85% of both legal and illegal migrants remitted. For remitting
migrants, Figure 2 depicts simple kernel density estimates of log remittances,
and after ﬁltering out log wages (since we are interested in a direct illegality
eﬀect, and remittances are positively correlated with wages). For the 1980s
data, the densities for illegal and legal migrants are very similar. For the 1990s
data a small shift of the density appears to be present, even after ﬁltering out
log wages.
Figure 2: approximately here
In summary, we ﬁnd, ﬁrst, that our samples exhibit characteristics broadly
14comparable to other studies usingM M Pa n do t h e rd a t ad e s p i t ed i ﬀerent sam-
ple selection rules and objectives. Second, we observe diﬀerences in average
characteristics between the groups of illegal and legal migrants, as well as over
time, but these are moderate. Hence there is scope for examining causal eﬀects
of legal status conditional on similar characteristics. At the same time the ob-
served diﬀerences in outcomes allow scope for the potential presence of illegality
eﬀects.
4 Empirical Results I: The Control Function,
and Illegality Eﬀects on Wages
We proceed to implement the empirical agenda outlined in Section 2.5, dis-
cussing the estimates of the control function before considering the estimates of
the illegality eﬀects on wages.
The implementation of the control function approach requires a prior esti-
mate of the propensity score. Since the speciﬁc results are of no direct interest,
we have collected these in Appendix B. Relevant for the what follows are the
conclusions that (i) the covariates collected in Z2 a n di n c l u d e di nt h ep r o p e n s i t y
score equation but excluded from the wage equation are relevant, so the propen-
sity score is indeed a non-trivial function of Z2; these encompass some demo-
graphics measures (marital status, numbers of workers and number of children
in the source household in Mexico), and the wealth and deprivation measures
relating to the ﬁnanceability of costly migration (assets and livestock owned by
source household prior to migration, dwelling descriptors, illiteracy and migra-
tion measures at community level, an indicator for traditional migration states);
(ii) we conclude the existence of limits sets for the covariates necessary for the
identiﬁcation at inﬁnity.
For our estimation of equation (10), the list of regressors collected in X
include the human capital variables, age, and the network measures. The mar-
ginal eﬀects are as expected, and we concentrate on the two principal features
of the estimation equation. 11
4.1 The shape of the Control Function
We depict the estimates of the control function b f and pointwise conﬁdence bands
in Figure 3, while in Figure 4 we juxtapose this estimate with the alternative
weighted estimate b fw.
11All our ﬁnal semi-parametric speciﬁcations are arrived at by backward selection. We have
started with a fairly large set of regressors, including interaction terms. Backward selection
has resulted in fairly parsimonious speciﬁc a t i o n sw i t hg o o de x p l a n a t o r yp o w e r . A saﬁnal
check on our speciﬁcations, we have veriﬁed the good behavior of normal QQ plots of the
residuals. Detailed results are available from the authors.
15Figures 3 and 4: approximately here
Consider ﬁrst b f for the 1980s. The estimated function is linear over its en-
tire support and visually indistinguishable from f (h)=0 .T h e f o r m a l W a l d
test supports the null of linearity (the p-value is 1). In addition, both esti-
mated degrees of freedom and estimated rank are equal to 1, and the estimate
is statistically insigniﬁcant. Using instead the alternative weighted estimator
yields a linear function with a positive, but statistically insigniﬁcant gradient.
We conclude that for the 1980s the error terms are approximately independent.
By contrast the control function for the 1990s data is strongly signiﬁcant and
non-linear. The visual conclusion is supported formally by the Wald test which
clearly rejects the null of linearity (the p-value is 0.00). The estimated degrees of
freedom are 4.3, and the estimated rank is 8. The alternative weighted estimate
exhibits a slightly larger amplitude.
4.2 Wage Penalties in the 1980s and 1990s
control 1a. b f (h) 1b. b fw (h) 2a. linear 2b. linear 3. f (h) ≡ 0
function (normal, V1 = V0)( n o r m a l , V1 6= V0)( U ⊥ V0,V 1)
A. 1980s
μ1 − μ0 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.13
SE 0.071 0.080 0.071 [0.080] 0.073 [0.078] 0.042
GCV 0.1309 0.1312 0.1309 0.1313 0.1304∗
B. 1990s
μ1 − μ0 -0.20 -0.19 -0.30 -0.30 -0.09
SE 0.116 0.118 0.111 [0.106] 0.111 [0.103] 0.042
GCV 0.1809∗ 0.1809∗ 0.1822 0.1826 0.1828
Table 3: Illegality coeﬃcients in the log wages regression (10). Notes: μ1−μ0 is
the coeﬃcient of the illegality indicator, SE is based on a sandwich estimator and
includes a correction for the generated regressor problem, GCV is the generalised
cross-validation score. GCV: ∗ indicates speciﬁcation with lowest GCV score.
Columns 2a and 2b: The control functions for the normal models are given by
(8) and (9), [SE] is computed using the parametric assumptions. The 1980s raw
diﬀerence between illegal and legal migrants is -.23, for the 1990s data we have
-.14.
Table 3 Columns 1a and 1b report the estimates of the illegality coeﬃcient
μ1−μ0 when the control function is non-parametrically estimated. Using either
unweighted or weighted estimator for f makes only a negligible diﬀerence, as
the estimates of the illegality coeﬃcient closely agree as do the GCV scores. In
the 1980s the estimated illegality coeﬃcient is -.12. The estimate of the control
16function in this period is insigniﬁcant, hence the estimate of the illegality eﬀect
δ equals the estimate of the illegality coeﬃcient μ1 − μ0. For the 1990s the
estimate of the illegality coeﬃcient μ1 − μ0 is -.2 Based on the estimate of the







Hence, by equation (4) the estimated illegality eﬀect b δ for the 1990s data equals
-0.22.
Overall, our estimates indicate substantial wage penalties for illegal mi-
grants, which have increased from -.12 in the 1980s to -.22 in the 1990s. Our
sensitivity analyses conducted in Section 4.4 suggest that these ﬁndings are ro-
bust. The increased wage penalty correlates with the measures taken by the US
government designed to curb illegal migration, including harsher penalties. In
this more hostile environment we observe that illegal migrants search the labour
market less for fear of detection,12 and, more importantly, we infer that their
bargaining power has diminished further.
4.3 Misspeciﬁcation Biases
Given the prevalence in the empirical literature to either ignore selection or to
assume joint normality of errors, it is of interest to quantify the misspeciﬁcation
bias of these naive approaches focussing on the illegality coeﬃcient [μ1 − μ0].I t
is also of interest which model for the control function is selected by the GCV
criterion. Recall that in the absence of selection we have f (h) ≡ 0,a n di nt h e
normal case depending on whether V0 = V1 the control function is given by (8)
or (9). Table 3 Columns 2 and 3 reports the associate estimates.
For the 1980s our estimate of the control function is linear and indistin-
guishable from zero. Hence it is no surprise that the restricted models yield
essentially the same estimates of [μ1 − μ0]. Imposing normality yields insigniﬁ-
cant estimates of the correlation coeﬃcients of the error terms.13 Imposing the
inferred restriction directly should and does yield eﬃciency gains. Moreover,
t h el o w e s tG C Vs c o r ei sa c h i e v e db yt h i sm o d e l .
Turning to the 1990s data, our estimate of the control function is highly non-
linear. Imposing a diﬀerent shape therefore should result in noticeably diﬀerent
estimates of the illegality coeﬃcient. Compared to our preferred estimate of -.2
(column 1a), ignoring selection (column 3) leads to an estimate which is half
this magnitude, and using either of the two normal models (columns 2a and 2b)
yields an estimate which is 50% larger in magnitude. We also observe that the
GCV score is minimized by the unrestricted model.
The naive approaches thus enjoy a lucky escape for the 1980s data. By
contrast, the misspeciﬁcation biases for the 1990s data are substantial.
12In a separate experiment we also include a dummy for whether the job was found through
the migrant’s own search. The eﬀect on wages is positive, small, and borderline signiﬁcant for
the 1990s with no eﬀect on the estimate of μ1 − μ0,a n di n s i g n i ﬁcant for the 1980s.





.02,.35). For the normal model with V0 6= V1, the point estimates of (ρU,V0,ρ U,V1)a r e
(.02,-.06) and of (σ0,σ1) are (.32,.36).
174.4 Wage Penalties: Robustness Analyses
We verify the robustness of our estimated illegality eﬀects in two experiments.
4.4.1 Non-Parametric Matching Estimates for the 1980s
For the 1980s data we concluded that the error terms U and (V0,V 1) are in-
dependent. Given this independence fully non-parametric estimators become
available and we re-estimate the illegality eﬀect using matching. This is of in-
terest since additive separability, imposed in our estimation of equation (10)
might not hold. This exercise is not repeated for the 1990s data since the con-
trol function for this case is signiﬁcant and non-linear, the result of dependent
errors.
If U and (V0,V 1) are independent, the illegality eﬀect is then identiﬁed non-
parametrically by the observable diﬀerence EZ|I=1{E{Y |Z,I =1 } −E {Y |Z,I =0 }}.
Matching proceeds by estimating for each illegal migrant the counterfactual out-
come Y0 from a group of legal migrants deemed similar. Denoting the imputed





Y1 − b Y0|Z,I =1
oo
. The literature (see e.g. Imbens, 2004,
for a survey) contains many procedures for non-exact matching, with no best
procedure. The usual approach is to use a distance functions which measures
the distance between observational units in some metric, and to match the k
nearest neighbors. A common procedure is to measure distance by the Euclid-
ean distance between the propensity scores, or alternatively by a vector norm
metric of the form ||v||
2
W = v|W−1v,w h e r eW is the covariance matrix of v and
v is taken to be the vector of diﬀerences in observables Z (Abadie and Imbens,
2006).
log wages in the 1980s nearest neighbors
M a t c h i n g 1234
vector norm -0.12 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11
SE 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05
propensity score -0.13 -0.13 -0.23 -0.23
SE 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.11
Table 4: Matching estimates of causal illegality eﬀects on log wages in the 1980s.
Table 4 reports the results. The smoothing parameter (number of nearest
neighbors) is varied from 1 to 4. The matching estimates using the vector
norm are very close to the results of Table 3, statistically signiﬁcant, and stable
across the numbers of nearest neighbors considered. Matching instead on the
propensity score, the estimates vary across the number of nearest neighbors and
exhibit greater variability, but are of the same order of magnitude.
184.4.2 Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence Estimates for Wage Penalties in the
1990s
For the 1990s data we concluded that the error terms U and (V0,V 1) are de-
pendent. Part of this dependence could have been induced by a person-speciﬁc
but time-invariant eﬀect, say η. We can address this possibility for a subset of
our sample since some migrants in the 1990s not only have experienced a previ-
ous migration spell, but also have changed legal status and have become legal
migrants. This data structure enables us to diﬀerence out η and to identify the
causal illegality eﬀect by a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence.
We brieﬂy sketch how the model can be extended to this data structure by
consider distinct spells indexed by s ∈ {1,2}. The potential outcomes are thus
indexed by (I,s), and we have
Y0,1 = μ0 + g(X1)+V0,1 and Y1,1 = μ1 + g(X1)+V1,1,
Y0,2 = μ0 + g(X2)+V0,2 + τe and Y1,2 = μ1 + g(X2)+V1,2 + τe.
The passage of time is assumed to aﬀect migrants equally (this is a standard
parallel trends assumption), and the growth eﬀect is measured by τewhere e is
the elapsed time between the spells. We consider ‘switchers’, who become legal
migrants, and ‘stayer’, who remain illegal migrants throughout. Letting dI be
the indicator for switching, we assume that the event dI =1is given by
dI =1( μdI (Z)+UdI > 0). (11)
The source of dependence between the error terms UdI and VI,s is assumed to
be a person-speciﬁcr a n d o me ﬀect η,i np a r t i c u l a rw ea s s u m et h a tUdI = η+εdI,
and VI,s = η + εI,s,w h e r eεdI and εI,s are assumed to be independent. Then
the expected conditional change in log wages over the two spells for switcher is
E {Y0,2 − Y1,1|X1,X 2,e,dI=1 } = τe+ μ0 − μ1 + g(X2) − g(X1).
For stayers we have
E {Y1,2 − Y1,1|X1,X 2,e,dI=0 } = τe+ g(X2) − g(X1).
The observable diﬀerence in diﬀerence between stayers and switchers thus equals
μ1 − μ0, which in turn equals δ in this model.
For our robustness analysis for the 1990s data we consider those migrants
whose ﬁrst spells falls into the 1980s, and whose last spell falls into the 1990s.
This produces a sample of 237 observations, of which 102 are switchers. Mean
log wages for switchers and stayers in the 1980s and 1990s are comparable to
the full sample means. In particular, for the migration spell in the 1980s, both
stayers and switchers are illegal migrants, and the mean log wages are 1.81 and
1.83 respectively. In the 1990s stayers’ mean (real) log wages fall to 1.74, whereas
switchers’ mean log wages are 1.84. The unconditional diﬀerence in diﬀerence
thus equals -.072. Conditioning, however, on observables and time eﬀects, our
estimate of the causal wage penalty μ1 −μ0 is -.12 with (robust) standard error
19.06.14 The estimate is thus signiﬁcant and substantial, and comparable to the
result reported in Table 3 Panel B. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimate for the
subsample of repeated migrants is smaller in magnitude than for the full sample.
This is to be expected since the full sample include migrants on the ﬁrst trip,
and being on the ﬁrst trip impacts negatively on wages.
5R e m i t t i n g B e h a v i o r
Estimating illegality eﬀects on remitting behavior requires a generalized ap-
proach since remitting behavior might be a function of wages which are them-
selves aﬀected by legal status. We thus extend the potential outcome framework
with endogenous selection to allow for endogenous regressors.
5.1 Estimating Illegality Eﬀects in the Presence of Inter-
mediate Outcomes
Consider potential outcome models for both wages E and remittances R, allow-
i n gw a g e st oa ﬀect remittances. We have
E1 = μE,1 + gE (XE)+VE,1
E0 = μE,0 + gE (XE)+VE,0, (12)
and
R1 = μR,1 + gR (XR)+ψ(E1)+VR,1
R0 = μR,0 + gR (XR)+ψ(E0)+VR,0. (13)
The notation XE and XR allows diﬀerent regressors to aﬀect earnings and re-
mitting. Let Z collect all relevant regressors.
The illegality eﬀect on remitting is
δR = E {R1 − R0|I =1 }
= E {R|I =1 } − EZ|I=1 {E {R0|Z,I =1 }}. (14)
Estimating this faces two problems. The ﬁrst empirical problem is the endoge-
nous selection problem addressed before. The new problem is that remitting
might depend on wages, which are also correlated with the other error terms.
This endogenous regressor confounds the illegality eﬀect on remitting.
These problems necessitate a new estimating strategy. We estimate the
constituent parts of (14) in a multi-stage procedure, noting that the ﬁrst term
E {R|I =1 } is directly estimable from the data, whereas the second term is a
counterfactual.
14Log wages are regressed on the indicators for the last spell and illegality, the interaction
between the latter two, and covariates. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimate is given by the
coeﬃcient of the interaction term.
20As regards the second term, we have E {R0|Z,I =1 } = μR,0 + gR (XR)+
E {ψ (E0)|Z,I =1 }+E {VR,0|Z,I =1 }. The last term satisﬁes E {VR,0|Z,I =1 } =
−
1−p(Z)
p(Z) E {VR,0|Z,I =0 } which is estimable. Consider a ﬁrst order Taylor
series approximation of the penultimate term yielding E {ψ (E0)|Z,I =1 }'
ψ
¡




μE,0 + gE (XE)
¢
E {VE,0|Z,I =1 }. The last term sat-
isﬁes E {VE,0|Z,I =1 } = −
1−p(Z)
p(Z) E {VE,0|Z,I =0 }. Putting these expression
together we have
E {R0|Z,I =1 } = μR,0 + gR (XR)+ψ
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E {VR,0|Z,I =0 }.
We seek to estimate the various functions involved in (15). This regression
cannot be carried out directly, since the argument of the functions ψ and ψ
0
needs to be estimated ﬁrst. But an estimate of μE,0 + gE (XE) as well as
E {VE,0|Z,I =0 } can be obtained from the separate control function augmented
regression using (12). This step 1 regression is
E {E0|Z,I =0 } = μE,0 + gE (XE)+E {VE,0|Z,I =0 }
= μE,0 + gE (XE)+fE (h)
where fE (h) denotes the appropriate control function (with h<0). Next, to
estimate the functions μR,0 + gR (XR) and ψ and hence ψ
0 in (15) consider the
remitting equation (13) for R0 for the sample of legal migrants. The endogeneity
problem implies that E0,V R,0 and I are potentially correlated. We overcome
this endogeneity problem in step 2 by conditioning on an estimate of the error
term VE,0 as in Das et al. (2003). Thus E {R0|Z,I =0 ,E 0,V E,0} = μR,0 +
gR (XR)+ψ(E0)+E {VR,0|Z,I =0 ,V E,0}. The error term VE,0 conditioned on
can be estimated by the residual E0 − b μE,0 − b gE (XE) in step 1. We estimate
the bias E {VR,0|Z,I =0 ,V E,0} in practice non-parametrically by a bivariate
(non-isotropic tensor product) spline deﬁned over h and the estimate of VE,0.
F i n a l l y ,w ea s s e m b l et h ee s t i m a t eo fE {R0|Z,I =1 } by computing the pre-
dicted sample analogue of the RHS of (15). This is then averaged over observ-
ables Z of illegal migrants to obtain the estimate of EZ|I=1 {E {R0|Z,I =1 }}.
The illegality eﬀect δR is then estimated by the diﬀerence between the estimates
of E {R|I =1 } and EZ|I=1 {E {R0|Z,I =1 }}.
To summarize, we estimate the unknown functions in (15) by estimating
separately the control function augmented earnings regression (step 1) and the
control function augmented remitting regression (step 2) for legal migrants . The
latter’s control function includes conditioning on the residual of the earnings
regression. We then predict E {R0|Z,I =1 } for illegal migrants, average across
covariates Z,a n dﬁnally diﬀerence from E {R|I =1 } to arrive at the estimate
of the direct illegality eﬀect on remitting δR. Given the complexity of the
procedure, inference is carried out using a bootstrap procedure.
215.2 Empirical Results II: Incidence and Intensity of Re-
mitting.
We consider the incidence of remitting, and the log (average monthly) remit-
tances conditional on remitting. Recall Figure 2, which depicts kernel density
estimates of log remittances conditional on remitting, and of residual remit-
tances after ﬁltering out wages. For the 1980s the densities appear to be the
same for the two groups of migrants, whereas for the 1990s a small diﬀerence
appears to persist.
1980 1990
1980 1. incidence 2. log remittances 3. incidence 4. log remittances
raw diﬀerence 0.07 -0.21 -.02 -0.23
illegality eﬀect (δ) 0.004 -0.07 -0.04 -0.35
bMedian 0.07 -0.08 -0.05 -0.34
bQuantiles -0.37,0.55 -1.09,0.85 -0.11,0.01 -0.47,-0.20
Table 5: Illegality eﬀects on remitting behaviour. Notes: bMedian is the median
of the illegality eﬀe c ti nt h eb o o t s t r a pd i s t r i b u t ion, and bQuantiles are the .1
and .9 quantiles of the bootstrap distribution; R=999 bootstrap replications.
Table 5 reports the raw diﬀerences in means, as well as our estimates of the
illegality eﬀects. Consider ﬁrst the raw diﬀerences. Compared to legal migrants,
in the 1980s illegal migrants exhibit a slightly greater incidence of remitting, but
this is reversed in the 1990s. Legal migrants remit larger amounts. However,
wages could be a confounding factor, and we have shown in Section 4.2 that
illegal migrants suﬀer a wage penalty.
We therefore turn to the results of our estimation procedure. We brieﬂy
comment on the estimated control function. The step 1 control function is
the same as discussed in Section 4.1 with h<0. For the 1980s data, it is
insigniﬁcant, but for the 1990s it is signiﬁcant and non-linear. The step 2
control function mirrors this in that it is insigniﬁcant for the ﬁrst period but
signiﬁcant for the second period.15
T u r n i n gt ot h ee s t i m a t eo fδR,w eﬁnd that in the 1980s, legal status has
no statistical impact on either the incidence or the intensity of remitting. The
estimated eﬀects are somewhat smaller in magnitude than the raw diﬀerences,
imprecisely estimated, and a basic percentile (90%) bootstrap conﬁdence inter-
val for δR include zero both for incidence and log remittances.
For the 1990s the evidence is mixed. As regards the incidence of remitting,
the bootstrap conﬁdence interval for δR includes zero. However, conditional on
remitting, the illegality eﬀect on the amount remitted is larger in magnitude
than the raw diﬀerence, and statistically signiﬁcant, since the bootstrap conﬁ-
15The regressors in the ﬁrst step wage regression are those also used in Section 4. The
regressors used in the second stage regression include human capital variables, person level
characteristics (e.g. married) and wages, household level charactersitics (e.g. number of
children), and deprivation indicators.
22dence interval does not include 0. This evidence suggests that illegal remitters in
the 1990s sent 30 percent less because of the lack of legal status. The estimates
of the illegality eﬀect on log remittances is also consistent with the estimates
of the wage-ﬁltered log remittance density of Figure 2. The diﬀerence between
the results for the 1980s and the 1990s correlates again with the more hostile
environment for illegal migrants in the 1990s. Presumably, it has become more
diﬃcult for illegal migrants to transfer money from within the US and more
important to retain money to cope with the increased insecurity in the US.
5.2.1 Robustness Check: Remittances in the 1980s
As in the case of wages, we can investigate the robustness of our results for the
1980s data using matching, since we infer that the error terms in the selection
equation and the outcome equations are independent. Again, this conclusion
does not apply to the 1990s data since the control functions are signiﬁcant. Un-
fortunately, a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence investigation for this period is not feasible
since remittances are only reported for the last spell.
Table 6 presents the matching results for the 1980s. Note that matching
does not take into account the intermediate wage outcome. These constitute a
confounding factor as remittances are an increasing function of wages. Given
the negative illegality eﬀect on wages, matching yields a lower bound on the ef-
fect on remittances. Using propensity score matching, illegality eﬀects for both
incidence and amounts remitted are never statistically diﬀerent from zero. The
instability of the estimates is fairly pronounced across the smoothing parame-
ters. By contrast, using the vector norm for matching yields much more stable
results. For the amount remitted, the illegality eﬀects is again insigniﬁcant.
For the incidence, the estimated illegality eﬀect is signiﬁcant but small. We
conclude that these results in line with the estimate of our model.
nearest neighbors nearest neighbors
M a t c h i n g 12341234
incidence log remittances
vector norm -0.12 -0.10 -0.10 -0.09 -0.05 -0.12 -0.08 -0.06
SE 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.14
propensity score -0.15 -0.15 0.02 -0.02 0.30 0.23 -0.05 0.18
SE 0.17 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.42 0.32 0.30 0.29
Table 6: Matching estimates of illegality eﬀects on remitting behavior in the
1980s.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper contains a number of conceptual, empirical, and econometric con-
tributions. We have deﬁned rigorously the concept of illegality eﬀects, using
the potential outcome framework, as causal eﬀects of the lack of legal status on
23outcomes. Endogenous selection, if ignored, gives rise to a confounding selection
bias. We capture the selection bias using a control function. We propose a new
re-parametrisation of the control function, which is linear in case of a normal
error structure, estimate it non-parametrically, and test linearity in the empir-
ical application. To consider remitting behavior, the framework is extended to
allow for endogenous regressors.
Despite the substantial extent of illegal migration (about 3 percent of the
world population are migrants, of which 10-15% are estimated to be illegal;
about 80% of all Mexican immigrants who arrived in the US in the 1990s are
estimated to be unauthorized), the empirical literature on illegality eﬀects is
small. The leading papers consider wage eﬀects, either ignore selection or ad-
dress the issue not fully convincingly. In contrast to this, the selection bias is
an important focus of our analysis. Moreover, the literature has ignored alto-
gether the issue of illegality eﬀects on remitting behavior despite the extent and
importance of remittances.
We ﬁnd, for the case of Mexican migration to the US based on MMP data,
considerable and robust illegality eﬀects on wages, the penalty being about 12%
in the 1980s and 22 % in the 1990s. For the latter period, the selection bias is not
created by a normal error structure; wrongly imposing normality overestimates
the illegality eﬀect on wages by 50%, while wrongly ignoring selection leads to
a 50% underestimate. While we obtain similar estimates of the wage penalty
as Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark (2002), we have employed a completely diﬀerent
and much less restrictive identiﬁcation strategy. Since search behavior appears
to have changed only marginally (see Table 7), we surmise that the increase in
the wage penalty is due to the further erosion of the bargaining power of illegal
migrants resulting from the more aggressive measures taken by Immigration and
Naturalization Service designed to detect and curb illegal migration.
In contrast to these wage penalties, legal status appears to have small ef-
fects on remitting behavior. Hence lack of legal status does not give rise to a
new “exchange motive” for remitting, but illegal migrants seem to retain more
money to reﬂect the increased precariousness of their situation. These results
are relevant to migration policy as they quantify the substantial losses to the
migrant arising from the lack of legal status; turning this around, these illegal-
ity eﬀects quantify the substantial gains that would arise from amnesty-style
policies or the losses to the migrant from more restrictive migration policies.
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26A Estimation Details
First, we brieﬂy describe our estimator, which is standard (see e.g. Green and
Silverman, 1994, or Wood, 2006), and its distributional theory. Second, we
explain our methods for inference which extend standard methods. The need
for these arise since b h is a generated regressor, and the error term θ is possibly
heteroscedastic of an unknown form. Finally, we state our test of the linearity
of the control function.
For expositional simplicity we make a notational digression and consider only
the generic univariate case : Assume that response yi is generated by the DGP
yi = f (xi)+θi with E {θi} =0and i =1 ,..n. The function f : R −→ R is
assumed to be smooth. Given the additively separable structure of our model
above, the multivariate case is immediate, requiring only column binding of
model matrix components and row binding of the associated coeﬃcients. In an
additive setting involving more than one function note that these are identiﬁed
up to an additive constant. For identiﬁcation we therefore impose centering
constraints of the type
P
i b f (xi)=0 .
A.1 Estimation: Penalized Regression Splines
We assume that f (x) can be represented in terms of known basis functions as
f (x)=
PKf
j bj (x)γj where Kf is the number of basis functions. Given our
estimate of b γj, our estimate of f is b f (x)=
PKf
j bj (x)b γj.
The coeﬃcient vector γ is estimated by solving a trade-oﬀ between ﬁdelity
to the data and penalizing the estimated variability of the function f.T h e
smoothness of the estimate of the function can be controlled by applying a




2 dx which can always be equivalently stated, using the
above representation of f,a sγ|Pγ where P is the penalty matrix consisting of
known elements.
Write the DGP more compactly in matrix form Y = f + ε with f =
Xγ where the i-th row of X is
£
b1 (xi),..,b Kf (xi)
¤
.T h e n b γ (π)=a r g m i n
||Y − Xγ||
2 + πγ|Pγ where ||Y ||
2 = Y |Y denotes the squared length of a vec-
tor. The solution is b γ (π)=( X|X + πP)
−1 X|Y ,a n dw eh a v eb f = SπY where
Sπ = X (X|X + πS)
−1 X| is the smoother matrix. Note that linear functions
are unpenalized, and that π →∞results in a linear estimate.










where tr denotes trace (as ordinary cross validation suﬀers from a lack of invari-
ance problem). The remaining problem is the choice of the basis functions. We
use cubic splines in view of the approximation-theoretic optimality properties,
27using the so-called value-second derivative representation (see e.g. Green and
Silverman, 1994). Such splines require selecting knot points at which the basis
function is to be evaluated. This selection is arbitrary, and we use knots placed
at equi-distant probabilities of the quantile function.16 The GCV criterion is
also used to select between models with diﬀerent numbers of knots.
Finally, we brieﬂy comment on the ﬁrst-step estimation of the propensity
score p = E {I|Z}.L e t l be a known link function such that l(E {I|Z})=
μU (Z). Three link functions are usually considered: the identity link which
results in a linear probability model for the propensity score (Das et al., 2003);
the logit link l(p)=p/(1 − p) (Hirano et al., 2003); the probit link l = Φ−1.
In this paper we use the probit link because we seek to nest the normal case.17
The link function introduces a non-linearity, so the above estimation scheme
needs to be generalized. In practice this is done using iterated re-weighted least
squares.
Our computations are carried out in the statistical program language R,a n d
use Wood’s (2006) library mgcv.
A.2 Distributional Theory and Rates of Convergence
The distribution theory for the estimators conditional on the vector of smooth-
ing parameters follows from the fact that the estimators are linear since the
estimation problem can be transformed into a least squares problem. In par-
ticular, b Y = SπY where Y =[ Y1,..,Yn]
| and Sπ is the smoother matrix which
depends on the vector of smoothing parameters π. The estimators are there-
fore asymptotically normally distributed under standard regularity conditions.
Hypothesis testing can then be carried out using Wald tests.
Convergence rates are studied in Hall and Opsomer (2005) who show that, in
as i m p l i ﬁed setting, penalized spline regression estimators achieve the optimal
nonparametric convergence rate.
A.3 Inference: Non-Constant Variance
We pursue two approaches, namely a two-stage sandwich estimator, and, alter-
natively, a variance regression for greater asymptotic eﬃciency.
A.3.1 Sandwich Variance Estimator
First, as regards the two-stage sandwich estimator, we have
Va r{b γ} =( X|X + πS)
−1 X|Va r{θ}X (X|X + πS)
−1.I nt h eﬁrst stage, the
parameter vector is estimated ignoring the potential heteroscedasticity, and we
generated the vector of the squared residuals, which is denoted by r2. In the sec-
ond stage, Va r{b γ} is estimated by (X|X + πS)
−1 X|diag(r)X (X|X + πS)
−1.
16We have veriﬁed the robustness of our results to the choice of basis functions and knots.
17In our data, it turns out that logit and probit speciﬁcations yield very similar estimates,
whereas the normal probability model generates a signiﬁcant number of ﬁtted probabilities
exceeding one.
28A.3.2 Variance Regression and the Weighted Point Estimator
Second, we propose to estimate a variance regression, and to compute iteratively
a weighted estimate of the parameter vector. The details of the procedure are
as follows (see also Ruppert et al, 2003). Denote by g(x)=Va r{y|x} the
conditional variance. Let g(x)=e x p{fvar (x)}, the exponential being chosen to
ensure a positive variance estimate. The object is to estimate the function fvar
and thus g non-parametrically. To this end we assume that the vector (y − f)
has a normal distribution with zero mean and possibly non-constant variance
diag (g), N (0,diag(g)) (we verify this normality assumption using e.g. QQ
plots). Then the vector (y − f)





with mean g. We use this result for an iterative estimation procedure using the
squared ﬁtted residuals. (i) Denote by b f the ﬁrst stage estimate of f ignoring
heteroscedasticity. (ii) Obtain the vector of squared residuals b r2 =
³
y − b f
´2





Re-estimate the heteroscedastic model y ∼ N (f,diag(b g)) to obtain the new b f.
Return to step (ii) and iterate until convergence.
I nt h em a i nt e x tw eu s et h en o t a t i o nb fw in order to distinguish this weighted
estimate from the unweighted estimate b f.
In our application to equation (10), we consider a semi-parametric speciﬁca-
tion of the variance function g.S p e c i ﬁcally, we consider g as a function of the
propensity score p: g =e x p{fvar (p)}. Note that this nests the normal model
in which Va r{Yi|Z,I} is a quadratic in the hazard h, γ0 +γ1hiΦ−1 (pi)+γ2h2
i
with hi = h(pi), and thus a function of the propensity score pi.
A.3.3 The Generated Regressor Problem
Note also that in our application the error term is a composite one, which
includes the generated regressor problem. The latter can be isolated by the









.I fb f (h)=
PKf
j bj (h)b γj,t h e n∂f/∂hi can be estimated by
PKf
j [∂bj (hi)/∂hi]b γj.W i t h
c μU (Zi)=
PKμU








This expression nests, of course, the parametric normal case, since the control
function f is then linear.
A.4 Hypothesis Testing
Testing nested restrictions on the non-parametric model is usual implemented
using an approximate F-tests, where the degrees of freedom of the non-parametric
model are given by the trace of the smoother matrix. The test statistics has
approximately an asymptotic F-distribution (Hasties and Tibshriani, 1990), one
reason for the approximation being that the smoothing parameter is estimated
29but assumed ﬁxed for the asymptotic theory. We also compare the GCV scores
of various speciﬁcations.
A.4.1 Testing the Linearity of the Control Function
Of particular interest is the linearity of the control f in equation (10). As regards
the formal test, note that a linear function (i) implies linear restrictions on the
cubic spline, and (ii) is not penalized. Since the estimator has an asymptotic
normal distribution, the null of linearity can then be tested using a Wald test.
The details of the Wald test depend on the parametrisation of the spline, in
our case the value-second derivative representation subject to an identiﬁability
constraint.18 Let f (h)=XB,f (h)γf where XB,f is the part of the basis matrix
pertaining to f and evaluated at the vector h,a n dγf is the associated vector
of parameters. The estimate is of course b f (h)=XB,f (h)b γf.L e ttf denote the
vector of knots of the spline, and nf the numbers of knots. Then the null of
linearity implies Rγf − r =0with R = XB,f (tf) and r = f (tf)=atf + b1nf
with scalars a and b.L e t Vf be the estimated covariance matrix of γf.T h i s
matrix is likely to be rank deﬁcient when the smoothing (penalty) parameter
is large; this situation occurs under the null of linearity since the cubic spline
of the unrestricted model needs to be heavily penalized. Denote by V g− the
Moore-Penrose generalized inverse of a matrix V . Then the Wald test statistic
£
Rb γf − r
¤| [RVfR|]
g− £
Rb γf − r
¤
(17)
is a random variable which follows asymptotically a chi-squared distribution
with degrees of freedom equal to the number of elements of γf (i.e. nf−1). This
result is only approximate, however, since uncertainty induced by the estimation
of the smoothing parameter is ignored. The values of a and b are obtained in
practice by regressing b f (th) on th.
We complement this formal test of course by the visual inspection of the
estimate b f. Additional information is provided by the estimated rank of the
smoother matrix, given by the number of positive eigenvalues, since using a full
rank (Kf À 1) penalized cubic regression spline to estimate a linear function
results in an estimated rank of one (as well as a large estimate of the smoothing
parameter).
B The Propensity Score Equation
The regressors for the propensity score equation can be grouped into measures
of demographics, of individual human capital, of household and locality speciﬁc
networks, and ﬁnally of household and locality speciﬁc wealth and deprivation.19
18The identiﬁability constraint is Cfγf =0with Cf =1
|
nXB,f (h) where 1n is a vector of
ones of length equal to the sample size.
19Speciﬁcally, the regressors include human capital variables (education and English), per-
son level characteristics (age, married), source household characteristics in Mexico (numbers
of workers and children), network measures (greencard, ﬁrst trip, total trips, traditional, mi-
30Signiﬁcant time eﬀects relate to changes in legislation and border enforcement
(1987 onwards, 1991, 1996). All the regressors have the expected signs, and
the estimated equations have good explanatory power, explaining 47% of the
deviance for the 1980s data, and 42% for the 1990s data.
Important for the empirical implementation is the inclusion of covariates Z2
which induce variation in the propensity score, but which are excluded from
the wage equation. In our particular case, we include variables which relate
to the ﬁnanceability of a costly migration trip. In particular, illegal migration
is more costly than legal migration since people smugglers are often involved,
and is typically beyond the means of the poorest households. We thus include
some demographics measures (marital status, numbers of workers and number
of children in the source household in Mexico) which relate to the needs and
incomes of the household in Mexico, and direct wealth and deprivation measures
for the source household in Mexico prior to migration. For instance, we include
livestock which can be considered as a liquid asset. We verify the signiﬁance
of these covariates. Moreover, these covariates should play no direct role in
determining wages in the US.
Finally, Figure 5 depicts simple kernel density estimates of the propensity
score for illegal and legal migrants for the two periods. The main feature of the
plots are: (i) the propensity scores overlap: for illegal migrants with a given
propensity score there are legal migrants with similar propensity scores; (ii)
for both groups we common support is (0,1), and we conclude the existence of
limits sets for the covariates necessary for the identiﬁcation at inﬁnity.
Figure 5: approximately here
CD a t a A p p e n d i x
This brief appendix collects brief deﬁnitions of some selected variables.
The illegality indicator: We deﬁne as illegal migrants those migrants
w h oh a v ee n t e r e dt h eU S‘ w i t h o u td o c u m e n t s ’ ,o rw h oh a v ee n t e r e dt h eU So n
a tourist visa and have subsequently worked.
Human capital variables: E d u c a t i o ni sm e a s u r e di nb o t hy e a r s ,a n dt h e
following ordered categories based on years: Less than Primary (< 6y e a r s ) ,
Primary (6 years), Secondary (> 6y e a r sa n d< 12 years), Higher than Secondary
(>12 years). English refers to the migrant self-reporting a high level of English
proﬁciency. Skill refers to the skill level of the last job in Mexico before migra-
tion, and is obtained from reported occupational classiﬁcations, and Skilled
gration prevalence), wealth and deprivation measures of the source household in Mexico prior
to migration (livestock, refrigerator, phone, car, dirt ﬂoor, and similar indicators, as well as
adult illiteracy rate), indicators for work in agriculture and living in a small village, and time
eﬀects.
31refers to skilled occupations. Agriculture indicates individuals working in agri-
culture in Mexico before migration. Also reported are skill levels occupations in
the US and US agriculture indicates those working in the agricultural sector
in the US.
Individual characteristics: Age (at migration) refers to age at the
time of migration and Married to marital status at the time of survey.
Migration trip characteristics: First trip is a dummy equals to one if
the migrant is on his ﬁrst trip to the US. Migration duration is measured in
months. We restrict our sample to recent migrants whose migration duration is
less than 5 years at the time of survey. California captures the destination of
migrants in the US.
Networks measures distinguish between weak ties and strong ties. The
former is measured by total trips which refer to the total number of trips to
the US by household members, and the latter by migration prevalence which
refers to the proportion of adults in the community with migration experience
based on census data. Given the long thin tail of Total trips,w ea l s od e ﬁne
the indicator, set to one if the total number of trips exceeds 6 (the modal
number). We also consider an indicator for whether the migrant has friends
in the US (Friends in US), and the number of family members in the US
(Fam in US). Traditional refers to traditional sending states (Aguascalientes,
Colima, Durango, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacán, Nayarit, San Luis Potosí
and Zacatecas). Greencard indicates whether the person has a parent or sibling
in possession of a greencard.
Demographics: Household size is the number of household members.
We also consider the number of children, and the number of workers in the
household.
Wealth indicators. We use several variables to capture household wealth
indicators: Car is a dummy equals to one if the household owns a car not bought
using US Dollars. Land refers to land owned by the Household if not bought
using US Dollars. Livestock refers to any livestock owned by the household
but not those bought using US Dollars. Dirtfloor refers to the ﬂooring of the
dwelling of the household.
Municipality level covariates a r ea l lb a s e do nc e n s u sd a t a . Municipali-
ties. Less than minimum wage refers to the proportion of workers earning less
than the oﬃcial minimum wage and was supplied by MMP. Note that the Mex-
ican minimum wage system was ﬁrst introduced in 1917, decentralised to the
level of the municipality. A major reform took place in 1986 from when levels
were set centrally. We also consider other deprivation indicators, e.g. the Adult
illiteracy rate of individuals aged at least 15 years.
Outcome variables: Log US Wages refer to log hourly US wages measured
in 1998 prices. Remittances is the average monthly amount (in constant pesos)
remitted back from the US to Mexico.
321980s 1990s
Legal Illegal Legal Illegal
migrants migrants migrants migrants
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Total US trips 13.68 (12.57) 3.78 (4.34) 11.13 (7.74) 3.29 (3.24)
Migration prevalence 0.35 (0.15) 0.26 (0.14) 0.33 (0.12) 0.24 (0.12)
Friends in US 0.74 (0.44) 0.67 (0.47) 0.69 (0.46) 0.57 (0.49)
Family in US 1.85 (2.04) 1.00 (1.54) 1.70 (2.08) 1.25 (1.72)
Green Card 0.01 (0.09) .03 (0.16) 0.19 (0.39) 0.15 (0.36)
Traditional 0.99 (0.09) 0.91 (0.27) 0.92 (0.26) 0.71 (0.45)
How US job was obtained:
Own search 0.30 (0.46) 0.25 (0.43) 0.30 (0.46) 0.23 (0.42)
Recom. by relative 0.29 (0.45) 0.37 (0.48) 0.30 (0.46) 0.38 (0.49)
Recom. by friend 0.25 (0.44) 0.31 (0.46) 0.31 (0.46) 0.30 (0.48)
Table 7: Summary Statistics: Network Variables
C.1 Measuring Networks
Table 7 considers the networks measures, which distinguish between weak and
strong ties. The former is measured by the proportion of households in the
community with migration experience. We also include an indicator for whether
the migrant reports to have friends in the US, and whether he comes from a
traditional migration state in Mexico. Strong ties are measured by the total
n u m b e ro ft r i p st ot h eU Sb yh o u s e h o l dm e m b e r s . I na d d i t i o nw ec o n s i d e r
whether anyone in the family is reported to be in possession of a green card,
and the number of family members in the US. Both weak ties and strong ties
are more pronounced for legal migrants than for illegals. Legal migrants have
more members of their households with US migration experience than illegal
migrants. The proportion of legal migrants in the 1990s with a relation in
possession of a greencard is slightly more than that among illegals, in the 1980s
the incidence is negligible. For both groups weak ties appear to have become
weaker over the two periods, whereas strong ties have become stronger.
Migrants also report how they obtained their job in the US. For both groups
own search and recommendations by relatives and friends account for more than
90 percent of job matches. Legal migrants exhibit somewhat more successful
individual search than illegal migrants (30 percent vs. 23 percent in the 1990s),
and show less dependence on family members (30 percent vs. 38 percent in the
1990s). This is another facet of the importance of strong ties to illegal migrants.
The pattern remains stable over time. Illegal migrants are expected to search
the labor market less because of their criminal status, and this is borne out by
the data. However, successful own search has fallen only slightly over time











































































































Figure 1: The distributions of hourly log wages for legal and illegal migrants.
Notes: Solid lines refer to illegal, and dashed lines to legal migrants. The










































































































Figure 2: The density of log remittances, and of the wage-ﬁltered residuals.
Notes: Solid lines refer to illegal, and dashed lines to legal migrants. Kernel
density estimates, conditional on migrants remitting. The residulas are obtained
from a linear regression of log remittances on log wages.




































Figure 3: Non-parametric estimates of the control functions. Notes: the dashed
lines represent a pointwise 95% conﬁdence interval.




































Figure 4: Unweighted v. weighted estimate of the control function by period.
Notes: the solid line is b f, the dashed line b fw.






























Figure 5: Kernel density estimates of the illegality propensity scores. Notes:
The solid line refers to illegal migrants, the dashed line to legal migrants.
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